Texas Wesleyan Law Review
Volume 19

Issue 2

Article 27

3-1-2013

Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Update
Nathaniel I. Holland

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr

Recommended Citation
Nathaniel I. Holland, Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Update, 19 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 539 (2013).
Available at: https://doi.org/10.37419/TWLR.V19.I2.25

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Texas Wesleyan Law Review by an authorized editor of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.

Holland: Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Update

PENNSYLVANIA OIL AND GAS UPDATE

By Nathaniel I. Holland'
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. ACT 13 AND ROBINSON V. COMMONWEALTH ...........
11. BUTLER V. CHARLES POWERS ESTATE AND THE
DUNHAM RULE ..................................
III.

T. W. PHILLIPS

IV.

MINARD

RUN

GAS & OIL Co. v. JEDLICKA ............

OIL

Co.

CHEASAPEAKE APPLALACHIA,

547
LLC

v. GOLDEN AND

THE PENNSYLVANIA RECORDING ACT ................
VI. OTHER LEASE TERMINATION CASES.................
VII. OTHER SIGNIFICANT CASES.................
.......

I.

ACT 13

543
.546

v. UNITED STATES FOREST

SERVICE ....................................................

V.

539

550
551
553

AND ROBINSON V. COMMONWEALTH

Act 13 of 2012 repealed the Oil and Gas Act, former 58 P.S.

§ 601.101 et seq., and added six new chapters to title 58 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes including, inter alia, chapter 23 ("Unconventional Gas Well Fee"); chapter 32 ("Development"); chapter
33 ("Local Ordinances Relating to Oil and Gas Operations"); and
chapter 35 ("Responsibility for Fee").2
Chapter 23 provides for county-imposed unconventional well fees.'
The fees are remitted to a state fund and are distributed to local coun1. Attorney with Steptoe & Johnson PLLC; A.B. 2002, Princeton University; J.D.
2006, Cornell Law School. I wish to thank my colleague Jessica Tully for her assistance in editing this Article.
2. Act of Feb. 14, 2012, Pub. L. 87, No. 2012-13, 2012 Pa. Legis. Serv. 2012-13
(West) (codified at 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2301-3504 (West, Westlaw through
2012 Legis. Sess.), available at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI[US/HTM/
2012/0/0013..HTM.
3. 58 PA. CONs. STAT. ANN. § 2302(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.).
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ties, municipalities, conservation districts, the State Conservation
Commission, the Fish and Boat Commission, the Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP"), the Public Utility Commission
("PUC"), the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, the Office of State Fire Commissioner, the Department of Transportation,
and the Housing Affordability and Rehabilitation Enhancement
Fund.4 Part of the fees are also distributed to the Marcellus Legacy
Fund, which distributes the funds statewide for various environmental
and infrastructure projects.5 Counties that do not impose fees are ineligible to receive any fee funds.' Payment of fees is regulated by the
PUC.' According to chapter 35, it is against public policy and prohibited by statute for operators to pass on the costs of the fees to mineral
owners by agreement.'
Changes to the Oil and Gas Act under the new chapter 32 on Development include increased setbacks for unconventional wells from
buildings and water sources,9 increased bonding requirements,"o well
reporting requirements," disclosure of hydraulic fracturing chemicals
(with trade secret confidentiality provisions),12 additional party permit
notifications,' 3 and increasing the area where there is a presumption
of water contamination by an operator.' 4
Chapter 33 provides for preemption on local regulation of oil and
gas operations' 5 and environmental regulation of oil and gas operations.16 Section 3304 ("Uniformity of Local Ordinances") provides
that permitted local ordinances (such as zoning ordinances pursuant
to the Municipalities Planning Code, 53 P.S. § 10101 et seq.) must provide for reasonable development of oil and gas resources, and section
3304 only permits local ordinances that (1) permit location assessment
operations, including seismic operations; (2) impose conditions on oil
and gas development no more stringent than those imposed on other
uses in a district; (3) authorize oil and gas operations as permitted uses
in all districts (excepting impoundment, processing, and compressor
4. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2314 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.).
5. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2315(a.1) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis.
Sess.).
6. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2302(a.3).
7. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2307(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.).
8. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3502 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.).
9. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3215 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.).
10. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3225 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.).
Bonding requirements for conventional wells were subsequently restored to their former levels by the Act of July 2, 2012, Pub. L. 823, No. 87, § 9, 2012 Pa. Sess. law 201287 (West). 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1606-E (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.).
11. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3222 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.).
12. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3222.1 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.).
13. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3211(b.1) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis.
Sess.).
14. 58 PA. CONs. STAT. ANN. § 3218(c) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.).
15. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3302 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.).
16. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3303 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.).
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol19/iss2/27
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operations), except that operations in residential districts may be required to meet additional setback requirements; (4) authorize impoundments, compressor stations, and processing plants as permitted
uses in certain districts, subject to additional setback and noise restrictions; and (5) do not impose hours of operation restrictions, additional
road use restrictions, or additional setback requirements more stringent than those in industrial districts in the municipality."
Section 3305 provides for advisory local ordinance reviews by the
PUC as well as challenges by interested parties, subject to de novo
appellate court review.J' Alternatively, parties may bring an initial
challenge directly with the commonwealth court.' 9 Attorney fees may
be imposed on municipalities that imposed ordinances with reckless
disregard for the requirements of this chapter enumerated, supra, as
well as upon challengers for frivolous challenges.2 0 After an order has
been declared invalid by the PUC or a court, the municipality is ineligible to receive any well fees.2 '
In Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania,municipalities, environmental advocates, local officials, and a physician brought a petition against
the commonwealth and assorted state agencies and employees to declare a number of provisions in Act 13 unconstitutional under the federal and Pennsylvania constitutions for a variety of reasons.2 2 The
respondents filed preliminary objections, and cross-motions for summary relief, challenging petitioners' standing and arguing that petitioners' claims were legally insufficient.
The commonwealth court cited the general standing rule that "a
party has standing to sue if he or she has a 'substantial, direct, and
immediate interest' in the subject matter of the litigation."2 4 The
court noted an exception to this doctrine:
[A] party can challenge the legality and constitutionality of a statute
on the putative rights of other persons or entities when '(1) the relationship of the litigant to the third party is such that the enjoyment
of the right by the third party is inextricably bound with the activity
the litigant seeks to pursue; and (2) there is some obstacle to the
third party's assertion of his own right.'2 5
17. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3304(b)(1)-(5) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis.
Sess.).
18. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3305(a)-(c) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis.
Sess.).
19. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3306 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.).
20. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3307 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.).
21. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3308 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.).
22. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463, 468-71 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2012).
23. Id. at 471.
24. Id. at 472 (citing William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. Pittsburg, 346 A.2d 269,
281 (Pa. 1975)).
25. Id. at 473 (quoting Phila. Facilities Mgmt. Corp. v. Biester, 431 A.2d 1123,
1131-32 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981)) (emphasis added).
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The commonwealth court held that the municipalities had standing:
Specifically, 58 Pa. C.S. § 3304 requires uniformity of local ordinances to allow for the reasonable development of oil and gas resources. That will require each municipality to take specific action
and ensure its ordinance complies with Act 13 so that an owner or
operator of an oil or gas operation can utilize the area permitted in
the zoning district. If the municipalities do not take action to enact
what they contend are unconstitutional amendments to their zoning
ordinances, they will not be entitled to any impact fees to which
they may otherwise be entitled and could be subject to actions
brought by the gas operators. 26
The commonwealth court similarly held that the municipal officials
had standing because they would be required to vote for what they
believe to be unconstitutional zoning amendments. 27 The commonwealth court dismissed the environmental advocates and the physician
for lack of standing. 28 The commonwealth court also preliminarily
ruled that the dispute was justiciable, as it did not involve a political
issue.2 9
The commonwealth court then considered petitioners' claims that
the conditions on local zoning in section 3304 violated substantive due
process and exceeded the commonwealth's police power.3 0 The commonwealth court first noted that "[zIoning is an extension of the concept of a public nuisance which protects property owners from
activities that interfere with the use and enjoyment of their property,"
and that "[s]o there is not a 'pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard,'
zoning classifications contained in the zoning ordinance are based on
a process of planning with public input and hearings that implement a
rational plan of development."" The commonwealth court then
stated that to be constitutional under article 1, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, zoning "must be directed toward the community
as a whole, concerned with the public interest generally, and justified
by a balancing of community costs and benefits. These considerations
have been summarized as requiring that zoning be in conformance
with a comprehensive plan for growth and development of the
community. "32
26. Id. at 476 (emphasis in original). The court also stated in dicta that the municipalities would have standing to assert the rights of property owners under Biester. Id.
27. Id. at 475-76.
28. Id. at 476-78.
29. Id. at 478-79.
30. Id. at 480-85.
31. Id. at 481-82 (quoting City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725,
732-33 (1995)).
32. Id. at 483 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Realen Valley Forge Greenes Assocs., 838 A.2d 718, 728 (2003)).
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol19/iss2/27
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The commonwealth court then concluded that section 3304 violated
substantive due process:
In this case, by requiring municipalities to violate their comprehensive plans for growth and development, 58 Pa. C.S. § 3304 violates
substantive due process because it does not protect the interests of
neighboring property owners from harm, alters the character of
neighborhoods and makes irrational classifications-irrational because it requires municipalities to allow all zones, drilling operations
and impoundments, gas compressor stations, storage and use of explosives in all zoning districts, and applies industrial criteria to restrictions on height of structures, screening and fencing, lighting and
noise. Succinctly, 58 Pa.C.S. § 3304 is a requirement that zoning ordinances be amended in violation of the basic precept that 'Landuse restrictions designate districts in which only compatible uses are
allowed and incompatible uses are excluded.'
The commonwealth court granted the commonwealth's preliminary
objections to the petitioners' claims that Act 13 was an unconstitutional special law, permitted unconstitutional takings, violated article
1, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,3 4 violated the separation of powers under the Pennsylvania Constitution, and was unconstitutional. The commonwealth court granted summary judgment in
favor of the petitioners' claim that section 3215(b)(4) 35 violated the
non-delegation doctrine because it permits the DEP to waive drill-site
water source setback rules without providing any guidance as to when
the setbacks may be waived.
In its dissent, the minority contended that the restrictions on local
zoning ordinances did not violate substantive due process because the
restrictions on ordinances under section 3304 struck a permissible balance between the need to harvest natural resources and imposing restrictions on operations based on type, location, and noise level.
Both petitioners and respondents have filed cross-appeals to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, but the Court has not yet issued an order granting or denying the appeal.

II.

BUTLER V. CHARLES

PoWERs

ESTATE AND THE

DUNHAM RULE

In Butler v. Charles Powers Estate, on July 20, 2009, plaintiffs John
E. Butler and Mary Josephine Butler filed a complaint to quiet title to
33. Id. at 484-85 (quoting City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 732 (internal quotation
omitted)).
34. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27 ("The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and
to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common property of all the
people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.").
35. 58 PA. CONs. STAT. ANN. § 3215 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.).
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a 244-acre tract against the estate of Charles Powers (the "Estate")."
The Butlers "alleged ownership of the land in fee simple and ownership of all 'minerals and petroleum oils' based on adverse possession."" After notice by publication was given, representatives of the
Estate appeared and filed a motion for a declaratory judgment that
they owned half the gas in the Marcellus Shale in and under the tract
based on reservation of "one half the minerals and Petroleum Oils" in
a deed recorded in 1881. The Butlers filed preliminary objections
claiming that the representatives of the estate "(1) lacked standing; (2)
failed to conform to rule or law by filing a motion for declaratory
judgment instead of a separate declaratory judgment action; and (3)
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."" The court
of common pleas of Susquehanna County granted the objection in the
nature of demurrer, holding that the reservation did not reserve the
gas in the Marcellus Shale as a matter of law, relying upon the rule of
Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, (the "Dunham Rule").4 0 The trial court
stayed the objection as to standing and dismissed the motion for declaratory judgment. 4 1
After an initial appeal was remanded to determine the standing issue, which was resolved in favor of the estate's standing, the Estate
appealed the issue of whether a reservation of one half of the minerals
reserved one half of the oil and gas in the Marcellus Shale. The Estate
argued that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's prior decisions that a
reservation of minerals did not reserve oil and gas in Dunham,
supra,4 2 and Highland v. Commonwealth,4 3 were not controlling on
the basis that the 1881 reservation preceded the Dunham decision and
that gas from the Marcellus Shale was different from conventional
gas.44 The Estate also cited U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge4 5 for the proposition that "whoever owns the shale, owns the gas." 46
First, the superior court reviewed the Dunham decision, which held
that a reservation of minerals did not include the oil under the popular meaning of the term "minerals." Next, the court reviewed the
Highland decision, which restated the Dunham Rule as follows:
36. Butler v. Charles Powers Estate, 29 A.3d 35, 37 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011), appeal
granted sub nom. Butler v. Powers Estate ex rel. Warren, 41 A.3d 854 (Pa. 2012).
37. Id. at 37.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 41-43 (citing Dunham and Shortt v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 41-43 (Pa.
1882)).
41. Id. at 37-38.
42. Dunham, 101 Pa. at 41-43.
43. Highland v. Commonwealth, 161 A.2d 390, 398-99 (Pa. 1960).
44. Butler, 29 A.3d at 40.
45. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380, 1385 (Pa. 1983) (holding that a coal
owner owns the coalbed methane).
46. Butler, 29 A.3d at 40.
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol19/iss2/27
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The rule may be briefly stated: if, in connection with a conveyance
of land, there is a reservation or an exception of "minerals" without
any specific mention of natural gas or oil, a presumption, rebuttable
in nature, arises that the word 'minerals' was not intended by the
parties to include natural gas or oil.

. .

. As a rule of property long

recognized and relied upon, the Dunham rule binds and controls
this situation: that the word 'minerals' appears in a grant, rather
than an exception or a reservation, in nowise alters the rule. To
rebut the presumption established in Dunham, supra, that natural
gas or oil is not included within the word 'minerals' there must be
clear and convincing evidence that the parties to the conveyance
intended to include natural gas or oil within such word.47
The superior court also examined the Hoge case's holding that
"such gas as is present in coal must necessarily belong to the owner of
the coal." 48 The superior court then reversed and remanded the trial
court's holding:
The Dunham and Highland decisions do not end the analysis, absent a more sufficient understanding of whether, inter alia (1)
Marcellus shale constitutes a 'mineral;' (2) Marcellus shale gas constitutes the type of conventional natural gas contemplated in Dunham and Highland;and (3) Marcellus shale is similar to coal to the
extent that whoever owns the shale, owns the shale gas. On this
record, we are unable to say with certainty that Appellants have no
cognizable claim based on the facts averred. Consequently, the parties should have the opportunity to obtain appropriate experts on
whether Marcellus shale constitutes a type of mineral such that the
gas in it falls within the deed's reservation.4 9
The Butlers appealed this decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, and allocator was granted on April 3, 2012, as to the following
issue:
In interpreting a deed reservation for 'minerals,' whether the Superior Court erred in remanding the case for the introduction of scientific and historic evidence about the Marcellus shale and the natural
gas contained therein, despite the fact that the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has held (1) a rebuttable presumption exists that parties intend the term 'minerals' to include only metallic substances,
and (2) only the parties' intent can rebut the presumption to include
non-metallic substances.5 0
As of February 20, 2013, the parties have filed briefs, and arguments
were held on October 17, 2012, but no decision has been issued.

47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 41-42 (quoting Highland, 161 A.2d at 398-99).
Id. at 42 (quoting U.S. Steel Corp., 468 A.2d at 1383).
Id. (quoting U.S. Steel Corp., 468 A.2d at 1383).
Butler v. Powers Estate ex rel. Warren, 41 A.3d 854 (Pa. 2012).
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T. W. PHILLIPS GAS & OIL Co. V. JEDLICKA

T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka involved a dispute between
a lessor successor ("Lessor") and a lessee assignee ("Lessee") as to
whether a 1928 oil and gas lease in its secondary term was producing
in "paying quantities."" Lessee brought a declaratory judgment action in 2005 seeking an order that the lease was still held by production." Lessors defended on the grounds that the lease had terminated
because of periods during which operating costs exceeded operating
revenues. The court of common pleas entered judgment in favor of
Lessee, relying on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling in Young
v. Forest Oil Co.s" The trial court rejected the application of an objective test, as urged by Lessor.54 This decision was affirmed by the superior court in T. W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka." The superior
court held that Young remained good law and that Lessor failed to
prove the bad faith of Lessee. 6
The Court began its review by noting that the lease's habendum
clause provided that it would continue past the end of the primary
term "as long thereafter as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities,
or operations for oil or gas are being conducted thereon," and that the
term "paying quantities" was not defined in the lease.
The Court then quoted its holding in Young:
But if a well, being down, pays a profit,-even a small one, over the
operating expenses,-it is producing in 'paying quantities,' though it
may never repay its cost, and the operation as a whole may result in
a loss. Few wells, except the very largest, repay cost under a considerable time; many never do; but that is no reason why the first loss
should not be reduced by profits, however small, in continuing to
operate. The phrase 'paying quantities,' therefore, is to be construed with reference to the operator, and by his judgment when
exercised in good faith."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected Lessor's argument that it
adopt an objective test, first on the grounds that it misconstrued
Young, which clearly requires consideration of a lessee's good faith,
but also was problematic in that any objective test would need to
choose an arbitrary length of time to determine whether production
was in paying quantities. 8 The Court instead concluded that under
51. T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261, 263-64 (Pa. 2012).
52. Id. at 264.
53. Id. at 265-66 (relying on Young v. Forest Oil Co., 45 A. 121 (Pa. 1899) (holding that consideration should be given to a lessee's good faith judgment when determining whether oil was produced in paying quantities)).
54. Id. at 266.
55. T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 964 A.2d 13, 19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008),
affg No. 10362-CD-2005 (Pa. Ct. Com. PI. 2005).
56. T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co., 42 A.3d at 266.
57. Id. at 270.
58. Id. at 272.
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Young, "even the determination of what constitutes a 'reasonable
time period' by which to evaluate whether a well has produced in paying quantities must be based on the unique circumstances of each individual case, and be driven by consideration of the good faith judgment
of the operator."5
Looking to the law in other jurisdictions, the Court determined that
"a majority of jurisdictions apply a subjective approach and will look
to a number of factors and relevant circumstances to determine
whether or not a prudent lessee would continue to operate the lease
for profit and not for speculation." 60
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated the test for whether a lease
is producing in "paying quantities" as follows:
[I]f a well consistently pays a profit, however small, over operating
expenses, it will be deemed to have produced in paying quantities.
Where, however, production on a well has been marginal or sporadic, such that, over some period, the well's profits do not exceed
its operating expenses, a determination of whether the well has produced in paying quantities requires consideration of the operator's
good faith judgment in maintaining operation of the well. In assessing whether an operator has exercised his judgment in good faith in
this regard, a court must consider the reasonableness of the time
period during which the operator has continued his operation of the
well in an effort to reestablish the well's profitability.6
The Court concluded that Lessor's evidence of a single-year loss
over a period of more than forty years was insufficient evidence of
bad faith and noted that even Lessor's own expert testified that he
would have continued to operate the wells.6 2 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the order of the superior court. Justice Eakin
filed a concurring judgment, and Justice Saylor filed a dissenting opinion, in which he argued that the court should adopt a hybrid test, in
which the first prong is whether profits exceed ongoing expenses, and
only if this first prong is met, consider under the second prong
whether Lessor can overcome the presumption of Lessee's good
faith.
IV.

MINARD

RuN

OIL

Co.

v. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE

Minard Run Oil Co. v. United States Forest Service, as amended on
March 7, 2012, involved a dispute between severed oil and gas owners
in the Allegheny National Forest ("ANF") and the United States Forest Service ("USFS"), as well as agency officials and environmental
59. Id. at 276.

60. Id. at 274 (quoting

RICHARD

W. HEMINGWAY,

THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS

298

(3d ed. 1991)).
61. Id. at 276-77.
62. Id. at 277.
63. Id. at 278-79.
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advocates.64 Under established, cooperative practices dating from
1980, mineral owners would give sixty-day notice of their drilling plans
to USFS officials, and the USFS would issue Notices to Proceed
("NTP") with operations.65 However, in 2008, environmental advocates brought a lawsuit seeking a declaration that the USFS was required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"),
under U.S.C. § 4321, to conduct an environmental impact study
("EIS") before issuing NTP.6 6 During the pendency of the litigation,
the USFS issued a moratorium on new NTP while a forest-wide EIS
could be conducted. The USFS eventually settled with the environmental advocates, despite the objections of the Pennsylvania Independent Oil and Gas Association and the Allegheny Forest Alliance. The
settlement agreement provided, inter alia, that
[the Service] agrees that it shall undertake appropriate NEPA analysis prior to issuing Notices to Proceed, or any other instrument authorizing access to and surface occupancy of the Forest for oil and
gas projects on split estates including both reserved and outstanding
mineral interests. Appropriate NEPA analysis shall consist of the
use of a categorical exclusion or the preparation of an Environmental Assessment or an Environmental Impact Assessment.6 7
ANF Forest Supervisor Leanne Marten then issued a statement that
there would be a moratorium on approval of new drilling until a forest-wide environmental assessment was completed ("Marten Statement"). The USFS also took the position that its consent was
necessary for any timber removal and that any attempt to conduct
new drilling without a NTP would be met with a civil enforcement
action or criminal penalties. 68
Subsequently, an oil and gas operator, numerous industry groups,
and the County of Warren brought an action to enjoin the settlement
agreement. The action challenged the ban on drilling in the ANF as
exceeding the USFS authority and to be in violation of both NEPA
and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq.
("APA").6 1 After holding a hearing on a preliminary injunction, the
district court issued an order granting the preliminary injunction on
the settlement agreement. The district court held that the drilling ban
was "final agency action" subject to review under the APA and that it
was instituted without complying with the APA's notice and comment
procedures. The district court also held that the issuing of NTP was
not a major federal action subject to review under NEPA.o
64. Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 670 F.3d 236, 241-42 (3d Cir. 2011).
65. Id. at 244.
66. See FSEEE v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 08-323, 2009 WL 1324154, at *1 (W.D.
Pa. May 12, 2009).
67. Minard Run Oil Co., 670 F.3d at 245.
68. Id. at 245-46.
69. Id. at 246.
70. Id. at 246-47.
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol19/iss2/27
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The Third Circuit review began its analysis by restating the standards for "final agency action" under the APA: "First, the action must
mark the 'consummation' of the agency's decision-making process-it
must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be one by which 'rights or obligations have been
determined,' or from which 'legal consequences will flow.'" 7 1 The
Third Circuit concluded that the Marten Statement represented the
consummation of the agency's decision-making process because there
was no claim by the USFS that it would revisit the moratorium until
the EIS was completed and the ban ended. 7 The Third Circuit also
concluded that the moratorium had significant legal consequences for
mineral owners, who would be unable to conduct any new drilling
without facing criminal penalties. 73 Therefore, the Third Circuit concluded that the moratorium was "final agency action" subject to review under the APA and that the APA's notice and comment
requirements had not been met.7 4
Next, the Third Circuit considered whether the issuance of NTP was
a "major federal action" triggering review under NEPA. After reviewing the Weeks Act, the statute creating the authority for the government purchase of the land in the Allegheny National Forest, the
court concluded that the only rules and regulations applying to the
reserved and outstanding mineral interests severed prior to the government's purchase must be expressed in the instrument creating the
reserved interest.75 The Third Circuit also noted that this conclusion
is consistent with Pennsylvania law, under which "a surface owner has
no right to determine what constitutes reasonable use in the first instance, and a mineral rights owner is under no obligation to obtain the
surface owner's approval prior to accessing the surface to extract mineral rights."" The court therefore concluded that the plaintiffs were
likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge.
The Third Circuit additionally held that the plaintiffs had shown a
likelihood of irreparable injury because oil and gas may be lost under
the rule of capture" and because of the risk of business threatening
economic losses. Finally, the court held that the USFS had failed to
show that current development was greater than that in earlier drilling
cycles and affirmed the preliminary injunction."
71. Id. at 247 (quoting TSG Inc. v. EPA, 538 F.3d 264, 267 (3d Cir. 2008)).
72. Id. at 247-48.
73. Id. at 248.
74. Id. at 249, 255.
75. Id. at 252 (citing United States v. Srnsky, 271 F.3d 595, 602 (4th Cir. 2001)).
76. Id. at 253 (citing Belden & Blake Corp. v. Commonwealth, 969 A.2d 528, 532
(Pa. 2009)).
77. Id. at 256 (citing Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 802 (Pa.
1907)).
78. Id. at 255 (citing Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Irizarry, 587 F.3d 464, 485 (1st
Cir. 2009)).
79. Id.
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V.

CHESAPEAKE APPALACHIA,

LLC

[Vol. 19

v. GOLDEN AND THE

PENNSYLVANIA RECORDING

Acr

In Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Golden, plaintiff operator
brought an action against the recorder of deeds of Wayne County,
Pennsylvania, seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction relating to the recorder's refusal to record oil and gas lease assignments
assigning multiple leases.so The court of common pleas of Wayne
County granted judgment in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the recorder to accept multiple lease assignments for recording.81 The recorder appealed, and the commonwealth court affirmed.8 2 The
commonwealth court began its analysis by noting that the Recording
Act requires that the recorder record properly acknowledged instruments upon submission." The court cited a decision from the Middle
District of Pennsylvania stating that the recorder's role is purely ministerial in nature:
The only situations in which a Recorder may refuse to record a document presented to him are where the appropriate fee is not paid,
where the document is not of the type that is statutorily entitled to
recording . . . and where the document on its face lacks a proper

acknowledgment. The Recorder is truly just a 'custodian' of
documents.8 4
The recorder contended that multiple lease assignments would not
permit her to record the property owners of the relevant parcels as
direct parties and that indexing each assignment with the property
owner was required for the record to constitute constructive notice
under title 21, section 358(2) of the Pennsylvania Statutes, which requires, inter alia, that an instrument be "indexed properly as to the
party in all alphabetical indices." 85 The commonwealth court rejected
this assertion:
The Recorder has not here asserted any legal authority for the proposition that anyone other than the assignor and the assignee
should properly be considered "the party" for purposes of indexing
an assignment of a lease. Therefore, the Recorder's argument that
she properly exercised her discretion in rejecting Chesa eake's multiple lease assignments for recording also lacks merit.
80. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Golden, 35 A.3d 1277, 1279 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2012).
81. Id. at 1280.
82. Id. at 1280, 1283.
83. Id. at 1281-82 (stating that conveyances and agreements concerning real property "shall be recorded") (citations omitted).
84. Id. at 1281 (quoting Woodward v. Bowers, 630 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (M.D. Pa.
1986)).
85. Id. at 1282 (quoting 21 PA. STAT. ANN. § 358(2) (West 2011)).
86. Id.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol19/iss2/27
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V19.I2.25

12

Holland: Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Update

2013]

PENNSYLVANIA OIL AND GAS UPDATE

551

The commonwealth court rejected the recorder's additional arguments, holding that the plaintiffs ability to record separate lease assignments was not an "adequate remedy" because the plaintiff had the
right to file multiple assignments and that requiring the recorder to
accept multiple lease assignments would contravene public policy."
VI.

OTHER LEASE TERMINATION CASES

In Heasley v. KSM Energy, Inc., plaintiff successor lessor brought
an action to have two 1942 flat-rate royalty leases" declared to have
terminated for lack of production of oil and gas." The parties agreed
that there was no current production of oil or gas." The trial court
granted judgment on the pleadings to the lessor." The defendants
appealed, arguing that the lease was held by annual flat-rate gas well
payments, citing T W. Philips Gas and Oil Co. v. Komar.9 2 The lease's
habendum clause provided that "[i]t is agreed that this lease shall remain in force for the term of twenty years from this date, and as long
thereafter as oil or gas, or either of them, is produced therefrom by
the party of the second part."' The superior court affirmed the judgment in favor of the lessor, holding that the secondary term of the
lease required production and that the flat-rate payments were only to
be made "while the gas from said well is used" (so production was a
condition of the flat-rate payments). The superior court distinguished
Komar on the basis that the royalty provision in that lease provided
for flat-rate gas well payments regardless of whether there was any
actual production.
In Burkett ex rel. Burkett v. Exco Res. (PA), LLC, plaintiff successor lessors brought an action for a declaratory judgment for cancellation of the 1916 lease as to 130 acres of the 180 acres in the leasehold,
and all deep rights, for breaches of the surrender clause of the lease
and of the implied covenant to develop the lease." The lease was
held by two producing wells, drilled during the ten-year primary term
of the lease.9 5 Defendant lessee-assignee operators brought a motion
to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), claiming
87. Id. at 1283.
88. PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND
GAS LAw § 8-F (2011) (stating that a "flat-rate royalty lease" is defined as "[a] lease
providing for payment of a fixed (frequently small, by contemporary standards) sum
of money as royalty").
89. Heasley v. KSM Energy, Inc., 52 A.3d 341, 342 (Pa. 2012).
90. Id. at 342-43.
91. Id. at 343.
92. Id. at 343 (citing T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Komar, 227 A.2d 163 (Pa.
1967)).
93. Id. at 345 (emphasis in original).
94. Burkett ex rel. Burkett v. Exco Res. (PA), LLC, No. 2:11-cv-1394, 2012 WL

1019025, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2012).

95, Id. at *1.
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that the plaintiffs' claims failed to assert a claim as a matter of law. 9 6
Plaintiffs conceded that the drilling of four wells satisfied the express
development clause of the lease and instead argued that the lesseeassignees violated the surrender clause of the lease.97 The district
court held that the plaintiffs' allegations of a breach of the lease were
sufficient to survive a motion for dismissal." The district court also
denied the motion for dismissal as to an implied covenant to develop." The district court held that as the only payments being made
to the plaintiffs were production royalties from the two existing wells,
the implied covenant to develop applied to the remaining acreage of
the lease.'" The district court distinguished Stoddard v. Emery on the
grounds that the lease did not specify a maximum number of wells,
but only a minimum.' 0 '
In Good Will Hunting Club, Inc. v. Range Resources, Inc., lessor
brought an action for declaratory judgment that its oil and gas lease
had terminated at the end of its primary term, as well as claims for
ejectment and trespass.o 2 Prior to the expiration of the primary term,
lessee had staked out a drillsite, obtained rights-of-ways and leases on
adjoining properties, unitized the property, obtained permits, constructed access roads, and began constructing the well-site on the last
day of the primary term.' The court held that the lease was ambiguous because while the secondary term indicated that the lease would
only be held by (1) paying production; (2) a dry hole and the drilling
of a second well; or (3) the plugging of a well, an additional clause
provided that the lease would terminate if lessee did not commence a
well before the end of the primary term.10 4 The court denied the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, holding that because the
lease was ambiguous, extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent was
necessary. 0 5
96. Id.
97. Id. at *4 ("[Tlhe Plaintiffs argue that the Court should determine and declare
that EXCO's persistent lack of use, investigation, or development of the untouched
portion of the Premises (for nearly a century) necessarily amounts to its determination that such segment of the Premises will not be "further" investigated or developed. Therefore, according to the Plaintiffs, such inaction triggers EXCO's duty
under the Lease to surrender and release the unused portion of the Premises.").
98. Id. at *5.
99. Id. at *8.
100. Id. at *6 (citing Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 772 A.2d 445, 452 (Pa.
2001)).
101. Id. at *7 (distinguishing Stoddard v. Emery, 18 A. 339 (Pa. 1889) (holding that
"where the number of wells to be drilled is specified by the lease, that number controls and no implied covenant to develop further can be read into the lease")).
102. Good Will Hunting Club, Inc. v. Range Res., Inc., No. 4:11-cv-1152, 2012 WL
722614, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2012).
103. Id. at *1.
104. Id. at *3-4.
105. Id. at *4-5.
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In Burke v. GAPCO Energy LLC, plaintiff lessors sought a declaratory judgment that their leases with defendant lessees were terminated." The lease contained an operations clause which provided,
inter alia, that
[t]he term 'operations' as used in this lease shall include but not be
limited to the drilling, testing, completing, (including by horizontal
and slant hole well completion techniques) reworking, recompleting, deepening, plugging back, or repairing of a well (and all work
preparatory, incident or related to any such operation) in search for
or in an endeavor to obtain, restore, maintain, or to increase production of oil, liquid hydrocarbons, or gas, or any of them.107
The defendants alleged that they cleared access roads, removed trees,
obtained well permits, prepared erosion and sediment plans, conducted surveys, and cleared and leveled the drill pad prior to the end
of the primary term.10 s The district court noted that the activities enumerated appeared to satisfy the definition of operations under the
lease, but it noted that the plaintiffs contended that as of the end of
the primary term, the lessee had only conducted cursory preparatory
activities.'
The district court denied the defendants' motions for
summary judgment, finding that there was a genuine issue of material
fact.1 0

VII.

OTHER SIGNIFICANT CASES

In Roman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., the Middle District of
Pennsylvania granted defendant operator's request to compel arbitration of the plaintiffs' claims for declaratory judgment that the parties'
oil and gas lease had terminated, as well as tort claims for slander of
title and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing."' The
court held that the broad arbitration clause contained in the lease,
which applied to any disagreement "concerning this lease, performance thereunder, or damages caused by Lessee's operations," applied
to the plaintiffs' tort claims because both tort claims concerned the
lease and more specifically the defendant's unitization of the lease at
the end of the primary term of the lease.' 2
In Rice v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., plaintiff lessors brought an action in the court of common pleas of Greene County for breach of an
oil and gas lease against defendant lease assignor and lease as106. Burke v. GAPCO Energy LLC, No. 10-1317, 2012 WL 1038849, at *1 (W.D.
Pa. Mar. 28, 2012).
107. Id.
108. Id. at *2.
109. Id. at *3.
110. Id.
111. Roman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., No. 3:11-cv-1614, 2012 WL
2076846, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2012).
112. Id. at *4-5.
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signee."s The defendants removed the action to the federal court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania, and the plaintiffs brought a motion to remand.1 1 4 The defendant lease assignor, Dale Property Services Penn, LP ("Dale"), was a Pennsylvania citizen for diversity
jurisdiction purposes under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).its The defendants
contended that Dale was fraudulently joined in that there was no basis
for any liability of Dale on the facts alleged."' Specifically, the defendants argued that an oil and gas lease is a conveyance in fee simple
determinable,"' and after assignment, the plaintiffs could not look to
the assignor for any breach of the lease. The district court held that
although the defendants' cases supported the evolution of the oil and
gas lease, it could not conclude with certainty that Pennsylvania state
courts would overrule the doctrine stated in Washington Natural Gas
Co. v. Johnson,"' that a lessee retains liability for a breach of the
lease after an assignment."' The district court remanded the case to
the court of common pleas of Greene County.' 20
In Katzin v. CentralAppalachia Petroleum, a lessor had brought an
action to invalidate a lease for violating the Pennsylvania Guaranteed
Minimum Royalty Act ("PGMRA").121 The trial court granted the
defendant judgment on the pleadings, holding that the lease provided
a minimum one-eighth royalty and that deductions of post-production
costs were permissible under the rule of Kilmer v. Elexco Land Services, Inc.'2 2 The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the lease violated
the PGMRA because of vagueness in the lease describing post-production costs. 23 The superior court affirmed the judgment in favor of
the defendants, holding that there was an implied promise that the
lessees would comply with the terms of the PGMRA in their deductions and that the plaintiffs could bring an action for breach of contract if the payments in fact did not comply with the PGMRA.12 4
In EXCO Resources (PA), LLC v. New Forestry, LLC, plaintiff lessor brought an action for declaratory relief that (1) as a lessee of the
oil and gas owner, it was entitled to use the subsurface for disposal of
113. Rice v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., No. 2:12-cv-00392, 2012 WL 3144318, at *1
(W.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2012).
114. Id.
115. Id. ("[Tihe parties stipulated in open court at a hearing ... that Dale is, for
diversity purposes, a citizen of Pennsylvania .... ").
116. Id.
117. Snyder Bros., Inc. v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 676 A.2d 1226, 1230 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1996); T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261, 267 (Pa. 2012).
118. Wash. Natural Gas Co. v. Johnson, 16 A. 799 (Pa. 1889).
119. Rice, 2012 WL 3144318, at *4.
120. Id.
121. Katzin v. Cent. Appalachia Petroleum, 39 A.3d 307, 308 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012);
58 PA. STAT. ANN. § 33 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.).
122. Katzin, 39 A.3d at 308-09; Kilmer v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 990 A.2d 1147
(Pa. 2010).
123. Katzin, 39 A.3d at 309.
124. Id.
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liquids from fracking operations and (2) it was entitled to operate a
disposal facility, pursuant to a separate license from the defendant
surface owner.' The oil and gas were severed from the surface by a
deed that conveyed "rights, titles, and interests in and to all of the oil
and gas . . . and the space occupied thereby."1 2 6 The district court

concluded that the deed conveyed a fee simple determinable in the oil
and gas and did not convey an interest in the bore space once the oil
and gas was removed.12 7 The district court also held that the parties'
course of conduct and the license agreements was consistent with the
defendant's ownership of the subsurface bore space. 2 Likewise, the
court concluded that the lease did not grant the plaintiff the right to
use the surface of the premises for water disposal, holding that it only
conveyed the right of access to the oil and gas."' Additionally, the
court held that the plaintiff failed to properly exercise its renewal of
the disposal facility license and therefore granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.13 0
In In re Bradford, a shallow oil and gas operator appealed an order
of the zoning board that it remove a compressor station located at a
wellhead.' 3 1 The township zoning ordinance provided for "Forest/
Slope Residence Districts" within which structures for oil and gas production, "including equipment necessary to drilling or pumping operations," were permitted uses.132 The zoning officer brought an
enforcement notice, claiming that the compressor station was not
"necessary to drilling or pumping operations" and was instead a
processing facility, which could only be located in a General Manufacturing District.13 3 The Zoning Hearing Board heard the testimony of
several expert witnesses as to the technical role of the compressor station, who testified that the station stripped hydrocarbon liquids, including propane and butane, from the gas and pressurized the gas into
a liquid to render it marketable into an adjacent pipeline.1 3 4 The
Board found that the compressor station was processing gas.xas On
appeal, the trial court affirmed the Board's decision that the compressor station was processing gas.'
125. EXCO Res. (PA), LLC v. New Forestry, LLC, No. 1:10-cv-1793, 2012 WL
3043008, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 25, 2012).
126. Id. at *3.
127. Id. (citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380, 1384 (Pa. 1983) and Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 25 A. 597, 599 (Pa. 1893)).
128. Id. at *4-5.
129. Id. at *6 (citing ChartiersBlock Coal Co., 25 A. at 599) and Webber v. Vogel,
42 A. 4, 5 (Pa. 1899)).
130. Id. at *9.
131. In re Bradford, 43 A.3d 544, 545 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012).
132. Id. at 546.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 547-48.
135. Id. at 548.
136. Id.
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On appeal to the commonwealth court, the operator argued that the
compressor station was a necessary permitted use under the township's ordinance. The commonwealth court noted that dictionaries do
not provide a clear distinction between production and processing.1 37
The commonwealth court rejected the Board's reliance on Kilmer v.
Elexco Land Services, Inc., concluding that Kilmer did not control because (1) it determined the line between production and post-production activities for purposes of interpreting an oil and gas lease and (2)
stripping was a production activity that took place at the wellhead."'
The commonwealth court cited section 603.1 of the Municipalities
Planning Code,' which provides that when there is any doubt in the
interpretation of a zoning ordinance, the ordinance must be construed
in favor of permitting the use, and the court concluded that the compressor station was necessary production activity.' 4 0 The court therefore, held that the station was a permitted use and reversed the trial
court.
In PAPCO, Inc. v. United States, an oil and gas operator brought an
action against the United States to quiet title to sandstone under a
tract of land located in the Allegheny National Forest based on a reservation of "minerals." 4 ' The Allegheny National Forest was created
from tracts of land purchased by the United States pursuant to the
Weeks Act.' 4 2 The deed at issue excepted and reserved "all the oil,
natural gas, glass sand and minerals of every kind and description
whatsoever[.]"' 4 3 The United States brought a motion to dismiss,
claiming that the claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, or in the alternative, that the reservation did not include sandstone.1 4 4 The district court held that the twelve-year statute of
limitations applied under the Quiet Title Act.' 4 5 The United States
argued that the plaintiff had notice of the United States pit mining
operation in 1991 based upon the opening of the mine in that year and
two notices in local papers. The district court held that the legal notices were insufficient to give notice to the mineral owner that the
United States was asserting ownership of the sandstone.1 4 6 The district court also held that the plaintiff had no duty to inspect what
would have revealed the 1.3-acre mine within the 12,000-acre tract

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 550.
Id. at 552 (citing Kilmer v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 990 A.2d 1147 (Pa. 2010)).
53 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 10603.1 (West 2011).
In re Bradford, 43 A.3d at 553.
PAPCO, Inc. v. United States, 814 F. Supp. 2d 477, 480 (W.D. Pa. 2011).
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 515-521 (2006).
PAPCO, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 481.
Id. at 483.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 491.
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purchased by the plaintiff, and therefore, the plaintiff's claim only began running in 2007, when it had actual notice of the mine.14 1
In regards to the reservation, the district court found that under
Pennsylvania law, "[t]he specific reservation of oil, natural gas, and
glass sand indicates that the parties intended that substances that have
commercial value are within the scope of the reservation."' 4 8 The district court found that at the time of the reservation, sandstone was
known to have economic value and that therefore, the sandstone was
included within the reservation. The district court accordingly denied
the United States's motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
147. Id. at 492.
148. Id. at 495 (citing Hendler v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 58 A. 486, 487 (1904), over-

ruled in part by Hall v. L. & W. R.R., 113 A. 669, 670-71 (Pa. 1921)).
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